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Abstract
The purpose of this thesis was to explore the philosophical and rhetorical elements
of Origen of Alexandria’s Contra Celsum. Herein, one can find to their delight three major
themes of ancient argumentation: the argument from antiquity, the moral effect argument,
and the argument from prophecy. The bulk of this thesis is the author’s own exegesis of key
passages in the Contra Celsum.
The major thesis advanced here is that the strategies of rhetoric used by Christian
and non-Christian in late antiquity were quite similar, in fact, exactly the same in many cases.
The interpretation of key textual passages in the Contra Celsum advanced here is offered as
evidence of the alleged similarities in rhetorical strategies.
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I.

Introduction
The focus of this inquiry is on the philosophy, rhetoric and argumentative structure

of Origen of Alexandria’s Contra Celsum. The Contra Celsum was a massive polemical text
written by Origen to refute the claims made by the Platonist philosopher Celsus in his attack
on Christianity, a work entitled the a0lhqh\v lo/gov, or True Doctrine. Origen’s defense of
Christianity presents a wealth of information about the status of Christian argumentation in
the third century. While the primary subject of this thesis is the Contra Celsum, other
representative texts of the first and second centuries will be used to better understand the
history of argumentation and the kinds of persuasion used by Christian thinkers. The thesis
advanced here is that the strategy of persuasion used by Origen was to present Christian
belief and practice as normative and superior to Hellenistic culture and religion by appealing
to a shared ground of common assumptions and beliefs between Greeks and Christians.

2

II.

Scholarship on Origen and Methodological Issues
One of the methodological problems of studying Origen is that many of his writings

are filled with interpolations. His Peri Archon, for example, was translated from the original
Greek into Latin by Rufinus of Aquilea, who admitted to toning down many of Origen’s
more controversial ideas. Fortunately, the Contra Celsum has survived in its entirety, with few
of the corruption issues associated with his other writings, and is available in a 13th century
manuscript and the Philokalia.1 A recent English translation by Henry Chadwick is widely
used by scholars. Despite the availability of the text and its importance for 2nd and 3rd
century Christian studies, there is a dearth of secondary literature on the Contra Celsum.
There is, however, a sizable amount of secondary literature on Origen’s exegesis of the Bible
and his mystical theology. Most of this scholarship is rooted in a Christian theological
perspective, usually focusing on Origen’s tenuous relationship to Christian orthodoxy.2
There has been a resurgence of interest in the thought and legacy of Origen in the
twentieth century especially. One of the major preoccupations of recent commentators has
been the question of determining the extent to which Origen was compromised in his
Christian authenticity by “outside” influences. Christianity is usually taken to be one thing,
self-sufficient and pure, while the “outside” influences—Greek philosophy, culture and
religion for the most part—are taken to be quite distinct and subordinate. These
interpretations often assume that the Christian tradition is hermetically sealed and can only

See Chadwick, Contra Celsum. Cambridge: CUP, 1953. pp. xxix-xxxii.
See for example Jean Danielou's Origen. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1955; Henri Crouzel Origen.
Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1989.

1
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subsume and transform other cultures and ideas when it comes into contact with them.
Characteristic of this view is Jean Danielou’s assessment of Origen:
“The genuinely biblical element [of Origen’s exegetical method] mingles with
a stream flowing from the culture of the time…The core of the problem,
then, is to unravel the tangled skein and separate the main threads of genuine
typology from the temporary accretions derived from the culture of the time.”3
The dominant metaphor here is the easily separable skeins of a rope, of which the less
important strands, once unraveled, will reveal a pure and substantial core. Danielou’s
magisterial treatment of Origen was responsible for sparking much contemporary
scholarship, so this observation concerns only one flaw in an otherwise helpful work. A
much more dynamic view of cultural interaction is needed to understand early Christian
literature.4
Such a preoccupation with the coherence and purity of systems led scholars like
Danielou to make such theological claims at the end of his work that, for example, “There
can thus be little point in asking whether every part of the system is logically coherent. The
source of unity lies deeper than that, in Origen’s intimate knowledge and eager love of the
Lord Jesus.”5 The Origen presented here by Danielou is a masterful philosopher and
theologian, uncontaminated by the parasitic influence of Platonism and Hellenism. Danielou
argued that Origen somehow embodied all of the available categories because his intellectual
and spiritual vitality was so complex and varied that a single category would only
oversimplify matters. Undoubtedly there is some validity in this view, but it cannot be the

Danielou, p. 185.
See for example Jonathan Z. Smith’s Drudgery Divine, The University of Chicago Press, 1990 in which
the Protestant biases of 19th and 20th century scholarship on early Christianity are revealed as disguised
anti-Catholic polemics. The obsessions with purity and originality pervade the works that Smith addresses
here as well and are similar to much of the scholarship on Origen.
5 Danielou, p. 314.
3
4
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case simply because the alternative—Origen as non-Christian, as a compromised Hellene—
is too horrible to fathom for modern thinkers.
Other scholars, like Henri Crouzel, saw Origen’s work as a strictly Biblical enterprise.
He has argued that Origen’s intellectual processes began by “starting from Scripture and also
using philosophic data and Hellenistic imagery.”6 It is quite unlikely, and probably
philosophically untenable, that Origen would have been so self-conscious and wooden in his
intellectual development, as to deliberately utilize “Hellenistic imagery” and “philosophic
data” to supplement an already fully functional Christianity. Cultural fusion is a much
messier process than this view of Origen piecing together ideas as if they were distinct areas.
A slightly more complex view of Origen’s interaction with Hellenistic culture that
takes us in more useful directions can be found in the work of Joseph Trigg, who has
observed that Origen “does not always seem to have been aware…of the extent to which
Platonism molded his understanding of the Christian life.”7 This seems to indicate that
creating Christian language is a complex affair, informed by sometimes subconscious
influences. The preoccupation with reconciling the supposed opposition between
philosophy and theology in Origen’s oeuvre is still present, even in Trigg’s work.8
Even very recent commentators have devoted much energy to constructing an
“orthodox” Origen by analyzing his relationship to philosophy, which usually turns out to
mean that philosophy did not overtake Origen’s Christianity. Mark Edwards has been one
particularly astute analyst of Origen’s relation to Platonism. He has argued in reference to
Origen’s interactions with Hellenistic philosophy that even “If Origen learned the use of
Crouzel, H. (1989). Origen. Edinburgh, T & T Clark.
Trigg (1983), p. 74.
8 See Trigg’s “Origen Man of the Church” in Origenian Quinta. Ed. by Robert Daly. Leuven University
Press: Leuven, 1992. Pp. 51-56
6
7
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allegory from the Platonists, the premises and eductions were his own.”9 This may very well
be the case—the point here is not to quarry with the exact relationship between Platonic
philosophy and Christianity in Origen’s writings—but rather with the single-minded
preoccupation with rescuing Origen from the clutches of his enemies. Edwards seems to
assume that a case needs to be made for Origen’s intellectual autonomy from philosophy.
Furthermore, the assumption still is retained in Edward’s work that a distinction between
Platonism as such and a fiercely independent (read: Christian) Origen needs to be made. The
tone of Edwards’ work and his predecessors often presupposes that “true” Christianity
retains a pure, solidified essence, and derivations from this essence become derivations
because they have been compromised by some parasitic influence. So, much of the
secondary literature has been concerned with Origen’s relationship to some normative
category of Christian orthodoxy. This will not be the focus of this thesis.
Instead of these disputes within Christianity, the focus here will be on the
argumentative rhetoric in the Contra Celsum. By “rhetoric” I mean simply a “technique of
persuasive discourse,”10 which can permeate a text in explicit and implicit ways. I will not
use it as a pejorative category, as it is often taken to mean in modern usage. Often the
pejorative sense of “rhetoric” is a skeptical reading of a speaker’s words, for example, in the
sense of a speech that contains much verbal artistry without any real underlying substance.
9 Mark Edwards. “Christ or Plato?” in Christian Origins: Theology, Rhetoric and Community. Ed. by Lewis
Ayers and Gareth Jones. Routledge: London, 1998. pp. 11-25. Edward’s view of the distinction between
Platonic and Christian allegorical methods in Origen is that in the latter case, participation in God is
through “historical epiphanies” and in the former through analogical progression. Origen certainly
believed in the historicity of the central elements in the Christian narrative (i.e. cross, resurrection, etc.)
but this distinction seems to be drawn primarily to distance Origen from Valentinian or more generally
Gnostic usage of the allegorical method, which are often taken to be imaginative repudiations of historical
truths.

6

Instead, “rhetoric” should be taken to signify all the vast discursive techniques by which a
writer is attempting to convince his audience of a particular point. There were, of course,
rhetorical schools that produced handbooks of rhetoric, all of which had great influence on
the style of Hellenistic literature—but the focus of this thesis will not be on the influence of
particular rhetoricians on Origen. Rather, the focus will be on the general strategies of
rhetorical argumentation employed by Origen to convince and persuade readers of his
understanding of the Christian tradition. A survey of some thinkers who were writing prior
to Origen will help give us some insight into the history of particular arguments used in the
Contra Celsum. We will begin by briefly looking at the Jewish historian Josephus because his
arguments concerning the antiquity of Judaism were very useful to Christian apologists.
Then, a quick examination of Justin Martyr and Tatian will bring us up to the time of
Origen’s Contra Celsum.

This definition is taken from Paul Ricoeur’s “Rhetoric—Poetics—Hermeneutics” in Rhetoric and
Hermeneutics in Our Time: A Reader. Ed. by Walter Jost and Michael J. Hyde. (New Haven: Yale, 1997)
p. 62.
10
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III.

Writers Before Origen

i.

Josephus
Many themes in Christian apologetic literature of the second and third centuries can

be traced back to the Jewish historian Josephus (37 ca-100 CE). Josephus had found it
necessary to defend Judaism from the accusations leveled against it by the Greeks. The
result of these polemical efforts was the Contra Apionem. Written after the Jewish Antiquities in
93/94 CE, the Contra Apionem was an attempt to establish the great antiquity
(a0rxaiologi9an) of Judaism as a response to the anti-Judaism of Greco-Roman polemicists.
The relevance of the Contra Apionem to Origen’s work is in the argument from antiquity that
Josephus employed, which Origen would later put to good use. 11 Simply put, the argument
from antiquity was an argument about which civilization was oldest. The prevailing view in
this period was that truth originated with the oldest human tradition. Thus, if Judaism could
be established as the oldest tradition, then later traditions owed their participation in truth to
Judaism. If his opponents argued that Judaism had borrowed ideas and practices from other
cultures—like the Greeks—Josephus could turn around and say that since Judaism was older
than these cultures, that the accusation was groundless.12

11 For a discussion of this phenomenon in relation to Origen, see Feldman, L. H. (1990). "Origen's Contra
Celsum and Josephus' Contra Apionem: The Issue of Jewish Origins." Vigiliae Christianae 44: 101-135.
12 Chadwick saw clearly enough that the proof from antiquity was absurd. Despite this negative appraisal,
he cautioned that “from a strictly historical viewpoint our superior smile is a grossly unimaginative
anachronism.” From his Early Christian Though and the Classical Tradition. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984. p.
14. It is hard to see how we would transcend our own contingency in evaluating the legitimacy of ancient
assumptions. Certainly we begin with our own ethnocentric judgments because none of us start from
neutral standpoints, but are we being “anachronistic” when we make judgments about the past? It seems
to be the case that only if we replace ancient beliefs with our own and then make historical evaluations
based on this transferal are we then guilty of “grossly unimaginative anachronism.”
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Josephus wrote the Contra Apionem in order to respond to the “malicious calumnies
of certain individuals”13 These individuals had argued that Judaism was much younger than
Greek and Egyptian culture, and thus inferior. The key passage for our purposes comes in
Book II of the Contra Apionem: “Each nation endeavors to trace its own institutions back to
the remotest date [to\ a0rxaio/taton], in order to create the impression that, far from
imitating [mimeisqai] others, it has been the one to set its neighbors an example of orderly
life under law.”14 Josephus is basically saying “See, everybody else is making this
argument—so, the Jews get a shot at it too.” The influence of such ideas on Origen would
be profound: he believed that Christianity was true in part because it could trace its origin
through Judaism. However, if Judaism was not itself an ancient and well-established
religion, then Christianity, by extension, would be discredited.
To prove the antiquity of Judaism, Josephus used a variety of historical sources, both
Jewish and non-Jewish. One Egyptian historian by the name of Manetho was particularly
useful. Josephus claimed that Manetho’s history “furnished us [i.e. Josephus and the reader]
with evidence from Egyptian literature on two most important points: first that we came
into Egypt from elsewhere, and secondly, that we left it at a date so remote in the past that it
preceded the Trojan War by nearly a thousand years.”15 Josephus uses an Egyptian historian
to prove the antiquity of Judaism, but he simultaneously argues that the Jews were not
Egyptian. The Jews had to be unique; to say that they were originally of Egyptian
provenance would be the same as saying that Egyptian culture had created them.

Josephus. Contra Apionem. 1.1 in Loeb Classical Library: Josephus vol. 1. Ed. H. St. J. Thackeray. New
York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1926
14 Contra Apionem. 2, 152.
15 Contra Apionem. 1,104.
13
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After arguing for the antiquity of Judaism, Josephus claimed that later outsider
cultures simply borrowed their ideas from the Jews. Thus, derivative inklings of Jewish
theology can be found in Pythagoras, Anaxagoras, Plato and the Stoic philosophers, all of
whom had borrowed heavily from Moses.16 These other cultures who had borrowed from
Judaism were too elitist; they had crudely “addressed their philosophy to the few.”17
Josephus contrasts this with the universalism and integrated vision of the Jewish lawgiver,
Moses, who “implanted this belief [i.e. the unification of belief with practice] concerning
God… to all future generations.”18 So, Judaism was the oldest tradition—as established by
Manetho and others—and later cultures borrowed ideas from Judaism.
This view of Moses as a global legislator who created lasting norms for all cultures
had a richer and more exaggerated history in earlier Jewish historians. For example,
Artapanus viewed Moses as the inventor of Greek and Egyptian religion (an odd claim to be
sure), as well as singing and poetry, astrology, the science of hermeneutics, and Egyptian
hieroglyphs.19 The wide observance of a day of rest and dietary restrictions, for example, are
also given as proofs of Jewish influence on Greeks and Barbarians alike.20 Despite the Jews’
isolation from their co-religionists, Josephus maintained that their beliefs and practices were
in part the global paradigms for all cultures. Of course, these paradigms were corrupted by
malice and ignorance on the part of the non-Jewish “borrower,” but they still served as the
eternal moral exemplars for the world.

Contra Apionem 2.168
Contra Apionem 2.169
18 Contra Apionem 2.169-170
19 See Droge, pp. 26-27. Many of the techniques and themes of Jewish polemics in this period were taken
from Egyptian sources like Hecataeus of Abdera. Hecataeus had claimed an Egyptian origin for Greek
philosophy in that the Greek philosophers came as ‘tourists’ to Egypt to gather wisdom.
20 Contra Apionem 2.282. ‘Barbarian’ (ba/rbaroj) was Josephus’, and any Greek’s term for a non-Greek
because their language sounded like “bar-bar” to the untrained ethnocentric ear of the Greek thinker.
16
17
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Christian apologists found Josephus’ arguments about the antiquity of Judaism very
useful for their apologetic enterprises. Just as Josephus had appropriated Egyptian
historiographical polemics, the Christians would, in turn, use the Jewish arguments for their
own purposes. There is nothing unusual or ironic about the fact that Jews and Christians
alike adapted the same historical material for their own quite specific purposes. Texts have a
way of ending up in a variety of people’s hands who then decide to put them to use in their
own idiosyncratic ways. Now, let us look briefly at Justin Martyr and Tatian as precursors to
Origen.

ii.

Justin Martyr
Justin Martyr (100-165 CE) was one of the first Christians to respond to the growing

attack on Christian belief and practice during the second century. He was born in Flavia
Neapolis in Samaria21 and converted to Christianity ca. 130 CE. While traveling in Ephesus
he studied the philosophy of the Pythagoreans, the Stoics, the Peripatetics, and finally the
Platonists, which he took up whole-heartedly. He remained convinced of the full truth of
Platonism until, by his own account, he encountered an old man on a beach who convinced
him that Platonism was an inadequate source of truth because it lacked the revelation found
in the Bible.22 The revelation of the prophets in the Old Testament concerning Christ
convinced Justin to blend this new “philosophy” of Christianity with his already established
knowledge of the Stoic’s logos theology and Platonism.

1 Apology 1 St. Justin Martyr: The First and Second Apologies. Trans. by Leslie William Barnard. New
York: Paulist Press, 1997. For a concise and excellent overview of Justin’s life and apologetic strategy, see
Chadwick, H. (1993). Justin Martyr's Defence of Christianity. The Early Church and Greco-Roman
Thought. E. Ferguson. New York, Garland Publishing, Inc. 8: 23-45.
22 Dialogue with Trypho 3-10
21
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The revelation that the Christians believed was in the Old Testament was recounted
to Justin by this mysterious old man, who claimed that “long before the time of those
reputed philosophers, there lived blessed men who were just and loved by God, men who
spoke through the inspiration of the Holy Spirit…”23 Justin’s identity as a Christian was in
part strongly shaped by Hellenistic philosophy, but his conversion was confirmed by the
prophecies he found in the writings of the Jews. The Christian use of Old Testament
prophecies was a vitally important component of Christian argumentation in the early
Church. Its most explicit formulation was already embedded in the New Testament
Gospels. The liberal sprinkling of references to Psalms and Isaiah was widely used as a
technique of persuasion for potential proselytes. Justin claimed to be mightily impressed by
this proof, but it certainly helped that in Christianity, he thought he had found confirmation
of his Platonic convictions. In fact, of all of the Greek apologists of the pre-Constantinian
era, Justin was probably the most optimistic about the compatibility of Hellenistic
philosophy with Christianity.24
Many of the themes developed by Justin would be utilized and expanded by Origen,
so it is worthwhile to give a brief overview of Justin’s contribution to Christian apologetic
literature. His two Apologies, which were addressed to the Emperor Antoninus Pius25
around15626, were written to defend Christianity from Roman aspersions and to plea for
recognition and clemency from the Roman authorities for Christian believers.

Dialogue with Trypho 7
See Chadwick (1966), p. 10.
25 1 Apology 1
26 See Grant, Robert M. Greek Apologists of the Second Century. The Westminster Press: Philadelphia,
1988, pp. 52-53. The First Apology was probably occasioned by the martyrdom of Polycarp. Grant
believed that the two apologies were actually one, and were only separated later.
23
24
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The rhetorical strategy behind Justin’s presentation of Christian belief was to appeal
to the common ground between the Christians and his opponents. He realized that a
fideistic assertion of belief, without analogy or rational argumentation would be completely
unpersuasive. To accomplish this, Justin compares Christian stories with those of the
Greeks in order to suggest that the Christian stories are not really so odd and dangerously
novel as the Greeks had claimed. He also attacks the Greek stories for their immorality. For
example, to lessen the apparent offence occasioned by the Christian belief that God has a
son, Justin would simply show how the belief that the gods had children was prevalent in
Greek mythology. The Christian belief that God had a son was nothing “new or different”
when compared with the Greek belief that Jupiter had many sons, who, despite their divine
parentage, were given to wanton acts of human licentiousness.27 Indeed, Christ’s suffering as
a divine being is hardly scandalous in light of the indignities suffered by Bacchus, Asclepius
and Hercules.28 His virgin birth is no novelty when compared with the virgin birth of
Perseus to Danaë.29 Even the miracles of Jesus should not cause offence if one recalls the
miraculous healing stories of Asclepius.30
In addition to comparing Christian stories to those of the Greeks, Justin made good
use of the argument from antiquity. Here is a typical passage demonstrating a strong reliance
on this argument:
Whatever things we say as having been learned from Christ, and the prophets who
came before him, are alone true, and older than all the writers who have lived, and
we ask to be accepted, not because we say the same things as they do, but because
we speak the truth; and [secondly] that Jesus Christ alone was really begotten as Son
of God, being His Word and First-begotten and Power, and becoming man by His
will He taught us these things for the conversion and restoration of the human race;
1 Apology 21
1 Apology 22
29 1 Apology 22
30 1 Apology 22
27
28
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and [thirdly] that before He became a man among men some, under the influence of
the wicked demons already mentioned, related as real occurrences the myths which
the demons had devised through the poets, in the same manner as they have caused
to be fabricated the scandalous reports against us and impious deeds, of which there
is neither witness nor proof—we shall bring forward this proof.31

Justin here seamlessly weaves the proof from prophecy with his understanding of historical
truth, suggesting that the truth of the prophetic passages, at least in part, is attested to by
their provenance in a most ancient past. He did not rest his argument on the Christian
reading of the Septuagint alone—such an appeal would have seemed too partisan. Instead,
he presents the Greek poets as third-party witnesses to Christianity, with the implicit
suggestion to the non-Christian reader being that these are more objective witnesses to
Christianity than the Judeo-Christian literature.
The bulk of Justin’s appeal to non-Christian prophetic sources relied on the so-called
Sybilline oracles. Justin’s belief in the Stoic doctrine of the logos gave him reason enough to
incorporate non-Christian stories. The logos spermatikos doctrine held that every human is
born with certain notions implanted in their mind, a kind of seminal reasoning that helps
direct philosophic and spiritual inquiry. With this in hand, Justin can argue that “Whatever
either lawgivers or philosophers uttered well, they elaborated according to their share of
logos by invention and contemplation.”32 Truth springs from one source—the divine logos.
Hence, whenever Plato and the Greeks speak anything that is laudable, it is “the property of
us Christians.”33
Such a universalistic reading of human knowledge was well suited to the goals of
Christian argumentation. It established the idea that what Christians believed in was
essentially nothing new, but a perennial expression of divine and ancient truth. Of course,
31
32

1 Apology 23
2 Apology 10

14

the Crucifixion and Resurrection as central components of the Christian story were in some
sense new, because they were recent events—but even these were prophesied by ancient
texts, and the truth they embodied was ordered and planned from the beginning. The
Greeks had probably misunderstood Judeo-Christian beliefs, but they nonetheless had
limited access to some revelatory truths. All of this was directed towards a complex
argument that combined Justin’s logos theology with various apologetic techniques, the aim of
which was to demonstrate that Christianity was no mere novelty.
The novelty of Christian belief is a dangerous possibility always lurking in the
apologetic literature, and Justin attempts to lessen this possibility by claiming that the
Christian doctrine of creation is quite similar to Plato’s theories about the origin of the
cosmos, and Christian eschatological belief is simply a reiteration of the Stoic doctrine of a
cataclysmic conflagration.34 The rhetorical program of forcing a common ground of shared
mythology and assumptions between Christianity and Hellenistic culture is an attempt to get
rid of any hint of novelty within Christianity. The implicit rhetorical question here is “Why
persecute us since our stories and beliefs have so much in common with yours?” Justin is no
Joseph Campbell, blithely combining myths into syncretistic narratives that embody
perennially occurring psychological truths. This is the case because, for Justin, even more so
for Origen, there is no deep affinity between the core revelations of Christianity and
Hellenistic thought. The observation of each apparent affinity is actually intended to
temporarily disarm the skeptical reader, for whom the charge of novelty was a powerful
indictment of unwarranted Christian belief. Christian stories are similar to Greek stories
formally, but unlike the latter, the former are edifying. If Jupiter is brought up as a point of
33

2 Apology 13
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comparison to a Christian story, he will later be eviscerated as a parricide.35 Bacchus and
other gods are derided for their sexual immorality and contrasted unfavorably with the
Christian deity:
“We are not persuaded that He [i.e. Jesus] ever was goaded by lust for
Antiope, or such other women, or of Ganymede, nor was He delivered by
that hundred-handed monster whose aid was obtained through Thetis, nor,
on this account, was anxious that her son Achilles should destroy many of
the Greeks because of his concubine Briseis. We pity those who believe
these things, and we recognize those who invented them to be demons.”36
Justin’s Platonic conception of God as impassible, eternal and uncreated gave him
ample resources for attacking the anthropomorphism of the Greco-Roman pantheon. His
attack on Greek anthropomorphism is not simply a project in deconstruction; he adds to his
critique what he sees as a substantive charge, namely that Jesus was morally pure, while the
Greek gods were blatantly immoral. To wit, he juxtaposes a moral Christ with an immoral
Jupiter in what emerges as a kind of moral litmus test for “true” deity. Justin maintains that
Jesus, unlike the Greek gods, was not sexually impure, and furthermore, Jesus’ miraculous
birth was certainly not the product of sexual intercourse.37 So, Christian revelation was not a
complete novelty and it contained much that was morally edifying, unlike the Greek myths.
Many of the assumptions that Josephus had made in the Contra Apionem surface
strongly in Justin’s Apology. Primarily because “Moses is more ancient than all the Greek
writers” Justin argues that all that is good and true in Greek philosophy owes its origins to
the prophets and the logos.38 The demons are the worst of thieves since they plagiarized

1 Apology 20
1 Apology 21
36 1 Apology 25
37 1 Apology 21
38 1 Apology 44
34
35
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Isaiah’s prophecy of the virgin birth in the myth of Perseus and applied other Scriptures to
Hercules and Bacchus.39
Justin Martyr was defending Christianity against the charges that it was a mere
novelty. He did this by showing the similarity between Greek and Christian stories.
However, in order to show why the Christian stories were preferable, he argued that they
were morally superior. The Greek stories, replete as they were with incest and murder at the
hands of the gods, were self-evidently inferior to the piety of Christian Scriptures. This was
a quite traditional line of argumentation and one will not be surprised to find it used quite
frequently by Origen in his Contra Celsum.

iii.

Tatian
Justin’s pupil Tatian (120-173) had a less pacific view of the compatibility of

Hellenistic thought with Christian belief. Tatian’s writings exhibit a marked disdain for
Greek religious ideals. His Oratio ad Graecos (Exhortation to the Greeks) is of a genre similar to
Justin’s work by the same title, but its approach to Greek culture and philosophy is quite
different. The general argument of the Oratio ad Graecos is that Greek religion and culture is
immoral and inferior to the Christian tradition.
There is very little reflection of the logos spermatikos in Tatian’s writing. Instead of
showing the inklings of truth in other traditions, he harshly derides the Greek philosophers
for gluttony, arrogance and general immorality.40 His technique is to ask rhetorical questions
that reveal the absurdity of Greek mythology: “Why should I reverence gods who take bribes
and are angry if they do not get them? Let them keep their fate: I have no wish to worship
39
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planets.”41 He attacks Homer’s Iliad on the basis that Helen is absurdly honored by the
Greeks, even though she was an adulteress.42 Tatian, like Justin before him, uses the moral
critique of religion to good effect and denies the use of allegory to his opponents. 43 The
Christian belief in the Incarnation is not “nonsense” when compared with Greek myths,
which are not only immoral but hopelessly anthropomorphic fantasies. The Greek audience
is warned to “not allegorize either your stories or your gods [mhde\ tou\v mu/qov mhde\ tou\s
qeou\s u\mw~n a0llhgorh/shte ], for if you try to do so your conception of divinity is subverted

not only by us but also by yourselves.”44
The Oratio ad Graecos also uses the argument from antiquity frequently. To buttress
this argument, Tatian employs a convoluted chronology intended to show that Christianity,
through Judaism, had legitimate claim to the most antique culture. In this vein, Tatian
argues: “But in regard to my present point, I am most anxious to make it absolutely clear that
Moses is not only older than Homer but is older even than the writers before him, Linus,
Philammon, Thamyris, Amphion, Orpheus, Musaeus…”45 Here we can see that Christianity
can be proven through the antiquity of Moses and Judaism. By Tatian’s time, it was
apparently sufficient to state the fact of Judaism’s antiquity, since people like Josephus had
already done the gritty historiographical work. With Justin Martyr and Tatian, we can see the
formulation of a coherent Christian apologetic tradition. The primary theme of their
works—the superiority of Christianity vis-à-vis Hellenistic culture—features strongly in
Origen’s Contra Celsum.
Oratio ad Graecos 2-3
Oratio ad Graecos 10
42 Oratio ad Graecos 10
43 For a useful discussion of these issues, see Dawson, D. (1992). Allegorical Readers and Cultural
Revision in Ancient Alexandria. Berkeley, University of California Press.
44 Oratio ad Graecos 21.2
40
41
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IV.

Origen of Alexandria’s Contra Celsum

i.

Date of Celsus’ True Doctrine and Origen’s Contra Celsum
Origen (184/5-254/5 CE) probably wrote the Contra Celsum in the last years of his

life, in or around 248 CE under the reign of Phillip the Arab.46 The pagan philosopher
Celsus had written his True Doctrine in the last portion of the 170’s, even though there is
some disagreement on this issue.47 It is entirely unclear what specifically occasioned the
writing of the True Doctrine, since we only know about it through Origen. It is also unclear
whether or not Origen was the first Christian to respond to Celsus, even though he probably
was the first to explicitly and systematically respond point by point.

ii.

What is known about Celsus
Celsus was a Platonist philosopher who had an impressive and wide-ranging

knowledge of Christian belief and practice. This knowledge was apparently no affectation;
he was apparently able to make a more devastating critique of Christianity than his lessinformed predecessors. Celsus’ critique was unique in some sense because of the level of
sophistication of his treatise and the fact that he had read some of the New Testament
gospels and probably portions of Genesis. Later Christians thought he was an Epicurean.
Eusebius, writing in the fourth century, labeled Celsus an “Epicurean,” which was a classic
Oratio ad Graecos 41.1 italics added
See Eusebius EH 6.36.1-3.
47 See for example Hargis (1999) pp. 20-23 for a discussion of the evidence surrounding this dating.
There is some meager internal evidence for dating which would point to the Decian persecutions in 178.
Hargis however, argues for c. 200 as the date primarily because Celsus did not, in his view, capitalize on
the anti-Christian rhetoric that was more popular in the 170’s. He posits that the absence of such a
critique indicates that the specific criticisms had probably faded by that time, having been replaced by
45
46
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term of abuse by both Christian and Greek thinkers alike.48 Undoubtedly much of this was
intended for rhetorical effect, but there probably was some initial confusion on Origen’s part
as to the exact philosophical leanings of Celsus early in his response. Origen began the
Contra Celsum with the assumption that his opponent was an Epicurean, but it is clear in later
books that he abandoned that position, realizing the Platonist leanings of Celsus.
Very little is known about Celsus outside of interpretations of contexts within the
Contra Celsum. Our only access to his True Doctrine is from what Origen himself quotes from
the Contra Celsum itself. It is fortunate that Origen quotes his opponent’s words at length,
but we cannot be sure if it was verbatim. We know he summarized quite a few passages, but
there is no compelling reason to think that he systematically misrepresented Celsus’ words.
Despite these problems, at the very least, we know that Celsus was seen as a “pagan”
intellectual of Platonic pretensions.49 He is generally thought to be a Platonist, at least in
part because he quotes Plato throughout his attack on Christianity, and his arguments often
rely implicitly on a Platonic framework. Despite this Platonic background, Celsus is
generally not viewed as a profound philosopher. For example, Michael Frede has argued
that “there is no reason to suppose that he [i.e. Celsus] was a philosopher of any
significance” and that the True Doctrine “must have seemed in many regards rather
other ones. This is still an argument from silence, and one could simply argue that Celsus, seeing himself
as a philosopher, simply had a different set of problems with Christianity than his contemporaries.
48 Eusebius. EH.6.36.2. Such labeling had apparently become de rigueur by the fourth century. Chadwick
notes that calling someone an “Epicurean” in Late Antiquity was tantamount to using the term “Fascist”
today. See “Introduction” in Contra Celsum, p. xxvi.
49 The term pagan, from the Latin paganus meaning ‘country-dweller’ or ‘rustic’ is generally a pejorative
term of Christian apologetic provenance. The more cumbrous locution “non-Christian” or the imprecise
adjective “Greek” are at least more felicitous choices because they do not come from a position of
Christian theological criticism. For a defense of using the term ‘pagan’, see P. Athanassiadi and M. Frede
(1999) pp. 4-5. They argue, unconvincingly I think, that the term ‘pagan’ “despite its strong pejorative
connotations…appears as the least unsatisfactory term to describe the adepts of non-Judaeo-Christian
religions in the Greater Mediterranean in antiquity.” They reject ‘heathen’, derivative of e0qniko/v as
being more strongly pejorative.
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uninformed and unsophisticated.”50 He may not have been a profound philosopher, but he
was the only non-Christian of the period that we know of who took enough pains to read
some Christian literature quite thoroughly and devise a critique.
The sophistication of Celsus’ polemic is due in part to his rhetorical skills and
education, but the real power of his attack is due to his knowledge and familiarity with
Christian and Jewish Scriptures. Celsus does not mention the popular criticism against
Christianity circulating in the second century; there is no reference to bacchanalian orgies,
cannibalism, incest or the other catalogue of stereotypes we find in the extant literature of
that time period.51 Celsus must have seen that these critiques would not have lasting power
beyond rhetorical effect, so his polemic engages in a critique, among other things, of
Christian Scripture. His knowledge of Judeo-Christian texts included the Epistle of
Barnabas, the Book of Enoch, Matthew and Genesis—a limited reading to be sure, but
nonetheless an advance on his predecessors’ knowledge.52
Some scholars think that the 2nd century apologists had read Celsus’ True Doctrine and
were replying to it indirectly in the apologetic literature. This may be the case, but there is
little clear evidence to substantiate this beyond imaginative readings of innuendo and
suggestion internal to the texts. The Contra Celsum was the first direct and sustained response
to the specific charges of Celsus’ attack, but it was written nearly 80 years after Celsus’ True
Doctrine. It is not clear how much damage the True Doctrine had on the efforts of Christian
missionaries, but clearly it was taken seriously enough by Origen that he devoted eight books
to respond to the charges.
See the rather dismissive account of Frede in Apologetics in the Roman Empire (1999), pp. 154-55.
See Simmons, Michael Bland. “Graeco-Roman Philosophical Opposition” in The Early Christian
World v. 2. ed. By Philip F. Esler. London: Routledge, 2000. p. 845.
52 See Esler, p. 846.
50
51

21

iii.

Origen’s Training and The Purpose of the Contra Celsum
Origen had received excellent training for responding to Celsus’ True Doctrine. He

was appointed head of the catechetical school at Alexandria ca. 206 due to his reputation as a
polymath.53 Concurrent with the beginning of the persecutions under governor Aquila
between 206 and 211, Origen began to teach Christian doctrine to potential proselytes.54 He
apparently had a considerable amount of freedom to learn and teach a variety of nonChristian sources to his pupils since the school did not have a fixed curriculum. From
Porphyry we have the testimony that Origen had studied under the renowned non-Christian
Ammonius Saccas, from whom he “benefited greatly” despite the fact that, as Porphyry
notes, he had “apostatized to an audacious and barbarous creed [i.e. Christianity].”55 We also
know that the catechetical school included a great deal of extra-Christian material in its
curriculum, which helped Origen deal effectively with a Hellenistic author.
Adolf von Harnack’s view of the catechetical school in Alexandria was that it was the
nerve center of Christian rationalism, so capable of persuading non-Christians that it
“overthrew polytheism by scientific means, while at the same time it conserved anything of

Eusebius thought it was around 203, see Hist. Eccl. 6.3.3. For a discussion of the later date and Origen’s
education specifically, see Roelof van den Broek “The Christian ‘School’ of Alexandria” in Centres of
Learning: Learning and Location in Pre-Modern Europe and the Near East. Ed. By Jan Willem Drijvers
and Alasdair A. MacDonald. Leiden: Brill, 1995, pp. 39-47. For a discussion of the purpose of the
Alexandrian school, see Robert L. Wilken “Alexandria: A School for Training in Virtue” in Schools of
Thought in the Christian Tradition. Ed by Patrick Henry. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984, pp.15-30.
54 Van den Broek, p. 44
55 Eusebius. Hist. Eccl. 6.19.6-7 Mark Edwards notes that Porphyry’s purpose here is to show that
Origen’s “instruction in Greek philosophy was so perfect that he deserved to be called a greek; hence his
adherence in his maturity to the Christian faith could be deemed by rhetorical licence an apostasy” p. 173
in “Ammonius, Teacher of Origen.” The Journal of Ecclesiastical History. Vol. 44, No. 2. Incidentally,
Edwards’ larger purpose here is to argue that Ammonius was not Origen’s teacher, a view that only
Heinrich Dörrie has advanced. For a discussion of Ammonius Saccas in detail, see Frederic M. Schroeder
“Ammonius Saccas” in Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt Part II, Vol. 36.1, pp.493-526.
53
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value in Greek science and culture.”56 It would be very difficult to determine and then
demonstrate the causal links between the reception of the Contra Celsum among Hellenistic
readers and any subsequent conversion to Christianity. Harnack saw the apologetic literature
coming out of the Alexandrian school as successful presumably because it employed more
rational means of argumentation than non-Christian polemics. It is a warranted inference to
suggest that the increased level of conversions in the third century had much to do with
Christian interaction with Greek culture and learning—Justin Martyr being a prime example.
The purpose of writing such a voluminous response to this recently deceased critic
of Christianity was, on the surface, a simple issue of responding to the request of his wealthy
patron Ambrose.57 Ambrose was a former Valentinian Christian who had been converted by
Origen58 and was his primary patron, supplying him with seven stenographers to whom he
dictated the voluminous Contra Celsum. Origen once referred to Ambrose as “God’s
taskmaster,” indicating that he received Ambrose’s patronage ambivalently.59 One can
surmise that Ambrose’s purpose in commissioning the Contra Celsum was to provide the
Christian community with a learned and authoritative response to a dangerous critic of the
faith.
Origen’s preface is replete with disclaimers about the purpose and necessity of the
Contra Celsum. He notes that Jesus was “silent when false witnesses spoke against him” since
“he was convinced that all his life and actions among the Jews were better than any speech
in refutation of the false witness and superior to any words that he might say in reply to

Qtd. In Wilken (1984), p. 16. The source was Harnack’s treatment of Origen in the Lehrbuch der
Dogmengeschichte.
57 CC Preface, 1
58 See Eusebius, EH. 6.18.1.
59 From the Commentary on John, Book V, qtd. in Crouzel, p. 13.
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accusations.”60 Presumably, the moral example of Jesus in the gospels makes formal
argumentation seem like so much sophistry. It would seem that Origen has precluded
rational argumentation. But he clearly gives it a major role in his own defense of
Christianity, because—as he tells us—some weaker Christians are in need of it.
Origen claimed that Celsus’ True Doctrine was a poorly written and intellectually
vacuous text, so obtuse that it could not even be characterized as fallacious in philosophical
terms.61 What he meant by this latter point was that to even commit a logical fallacy in
philosophy was suggestive of some skill, and that Celsus could not even attain to such a
minimal requirement. Despite this ad hominem attack, it is not clear that Origen truly thought
Celsus was “uninformed and unsophisticated.” Writing an eight-book response to Celsus—
a laborious, time-consuming, and expensive endeavor to be sure—would not have been the
best way to demonstrate the judgment that Celsus was a weak opponent. The difficulty here
may be in the reader’s eagerness to take the surface meaning of Origen’s rhetoric at face
value. It is one thing to disarm an opponent by ad hominem attacks; it is quite another to go
on ad nauseum against that opponent, expending great energy in the process while
simultaneously maintaining that the opponent is unworthy of any substantive response. The
reader also must not forget that the only source for the True Doctrine is the Contra Celsum
itself, which means that Origen had the prerogative to edit the order and flow of Celsus’
own argument.
So, the Contra Celsum was born of a disagreement between a Christian and a Greek
philosopher. On one side we have Celsus who thought “It makes no difference whether one
calls the supreme God by the name used among the Greeks, or by that, for example, used
60
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among the Indians, or by that among the Egyptians.”62 On the other side we have Origen
who believed that the Incarnation meant that God’s salvific power was available to all
human beings. It was this particularism of Christian belief—the idea that God had been
incarnate in only one human being—which scandalized Celsus. The theological
disagreement between Origen and Celsus was about the means by which divinity was
expressed to human beings. Celsus sees in Origen and the Christian movement a strong
arrogance about truth, exemplified by their belief that there is only one God. His complaint
is that in Christianity, a jealous and unjustifiably arrogant monotheism has arisen that
threatens the very social fabric of the Roman Empire.
The genre of the Contra Celsum is generally considered to be that of the so-called
apologetic kind. The genre had a considerable heritage in the second century with Justin
Martyr, Clement, Tatian, and Theophilus, but Origen was the first to write an apology
specifically addressing a particular text written by a specific author. The word “apology” is
derived from the noun apologia (apologia) and is cognate with the verb apologein
(apologein) which mean “a speech of defense” and “to make a defense” respectively.63 The
usual setting for a formal apologia was the courtroom64, and in some sense the apologetic
nature of the Contra Celsum resembles a courtroom setting. Propositions are presented and
systematically rebutted with lengthy argumentation and presentations of evidence; but of
course the “court” here is the implied reader of the text. As Frede has noted, Origen used

CC Preface, 5
CC 1.24 cf. 5.41
63 The editors of Apologetics in the Roman Empire. (1999) defined apologetic as “the defence of a cause
or party supposed to be of paramount importance to the speaker.” P. 1
64 See Frede’s discussion, pp. 136-7.
61
62
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the verb apologein five times in the opening preface of the Contra Celsum, thus signaling the
overtly apologetic structure of the text.65
The Contra Celsum is in many ways quite different from Origen’s other works, in
large part because it is a polemical text meant to answer the charges of a non-Christian. Its
tone and content are, accordingly, dramatically different from a homiletical discourse or a
mystical excursus. This is not to say that the Contra Celsum does not feature many kinds of
non-literal readings—which so characterize the other texts.66 However, the purpose of these
readings is different. They are aimed at lessening the offence of Scripture’s surface meanings
and at seizing the interpretative terrain from Celsus. The tone of the Contra Celsum is not the
pious setting of a homily, but the public defense of Christian ideas against the cultural
opponents of Christianity.
Early in Book I, Origen says that he is writing his response to Celsus not so much
for Christians—except those “weak in faith”—but for “those entirely without experience of
faith in Christ.”67 There are several elements in the text that implicitly support this claim.
One can reasonably assume that a believing Christian in the 3rd century was not the primary
target audience of the Contra Celsum because the subject of the text was a response to an antiChristian polemic written by a Greek intellectual. Furthermore, the arguments in the text
presuppose a lack of familiarity with Christian doctrine and theology on the part of the
reader. Another factor here is that Origen continually compares and contrasts Christianity
Ibid. p. 136.
I take “literal” to mean not the objective meaning of a text, given to any reader despite their leanings,
but a highly contingent reading of a text that is taken by the reader to be the clear meaning, the “surface”
meaning. What the text really means will rarely be the focus here; rather we will be interested in looking at
what Origen and Celsus took the text to really mean. Such readings were contested and just as historically
contingent as the readers themselves. As we will see for Origen, “literal” names the most basic, often
superficial account of a text’s meaning. But literal meanings often have plenty of non-literal elements like
figurative speech and metaphorical language.
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with Hellenistic culture and religion. This seems to imply that the intended audience was
educated non-Christians. All of these factors help substantiate the claim that the Contra
Celsum was a defense of Christianity meant to proselytize Greek intellectuals. It is also quite
likely that it was written to justify Christian belief and practices to the governing elites in the
Roman Empire.

67
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V.

Argumentative Structure of the Contra Celsum
The structure of the Contra Celsum consists of quotations from Celsus’ True Doctrine

and Origen’s response to each quotation. The result is a rather rambling apologetic tour de
force in which each major criticism of Christianity by Celsus is addressed, sometimes with
considerable overlap between sections. The division of the books was apparently not
planned out in a rigorous way at all; rather, it seems most likely that Origen simply ended
each book when the physical end of the scroll on which he was dictating the response had
been reached. The lack of systematic planning is also seen in Origen’s gradual realization
that his opponent was not an Epicurean. As he penetrated into the core of the arguments,
he found himself revising previous assessments that he had not carefully planned out before.
Origen’s debt to the apologists of the second century was quite significant, but his
own style and intellectual skills were different from his predecessors in many ways. Thus, we
will find that with one major exception, the structure and logic of the arguments employed
in the Contra Celsum owed their provenance—if not their particular expression here—to the
earlier apologetic literature and a vast panoply of Hellenistic sources. An examination of the
rhetorical techniques of the Contra Celsum can lead us to a more nuanced view of how
Christian discourse was manufactured and what the major presuppositions of that discourse
were.
Essential to Celsus’ assault on Christianity was his belief that the most egregious
error committed by Christians was their misanthropic and arrogant rejection of a program of
ancient truth. This august truth emerges as uniform and totalizing in Celsus’ vision: “There
is an ancient doctrine which has existed from the beginning, which has always been
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maintained by the wisest nations and cities and wise men.”68 The primary objective of
Celsus’ critique was to portray Christianity as a faddish religion, contrasted unfavorably with
a Hellenistic culture steeped in great antiquity and buttressed by traditional mores. In direct
contrast to the purported novelty of Christianity, Celsus claims that he has “nothing new to
say, but only ancient doctrines.”69
This “ancient doctrine” was basically a Platonist account of divinity, which held that
God is “good and beautiful and happy, and exists in the most beautiful state.”70 Implicit
within this doctrine was a rejection of Christian Incarnational theology since, if God “comes
down to men, He must undergo change, a change from good to bad, from beautiful to
shameful, from happiness to misfortune…Accordingly, God could not be capable of
undergoing this change.”71 Celsus believed that the Christians—with their belief that God
had become flesh in Jesus—were foolish because the eternal God could not become flesh.
At the heart of Celsus’ critique was a strong revulsion towards Christian anthropomorphism
that was embodied in the Christian belief that Jesus was divinized human flesh. Origen
countered this by arguing for a divide between Christ’s human and divine elements.

i.

Argument from Antiquity
Celsus’ emphasis on a perennially reoccurring ancient truth was a good occasion for

Origen to use the argument from antiquity. We have of course seen this theme in many
varieties in the writers surveyed above, but since our focus is on the Contra Celsum, it will be
helpful to clarify its presuppositions and implications for Origen’s discourse. For Origen,
CC 1.14
CC 4.14
70 ibid.
71 ibid.
68
69

29

the argument from antiquity presupposed that truth arose purely and completely in a most
antique past, and that if one could trace one’s own culture back to that past then one had the
right to claim intellectual and religious supremacy. The implicit presupposition behind the
proof from antiquity is that in the halcyon days of great antiquity, truth was singular and
pure, unvarnished by outside influences. All later formulations of truth were, at best, weaker
derivations.
Origen’s debt to Josephus’ Contra Apionem is clear in the passages where the proof
from antiquity is a salient feature. Christian apologists had long adapted this theme used by
Josephus to fit their own polemical agendas in order to argue that Christianity was the
expression of great antiquity, hence responsible for all that was good and true in later
traditions. This general observation has been amply reflected in the historiographical writing
about the period, but there have been few detailed analyses of the development of the
antiquity argument in Origen.72 The origin of the tradition was not, as it might be supposed,
with Josephus, rather it can at least be traced back to the Egyptian historians before the
Common Era. Philosophically, it might find its intellectual genesis in Hesiod’s notion of a
golden age that gave way to increasingly unsophisticated and depraved periods of history.
Regardless of its provenance, by the time of Celsus’ True Doctrine, it clearly was a
well-established polemical device that was generally taken for granted. When Celsus
describes Christianity as a late-breaking religious tradition, as a novelty and an innovation on
a sacred and received body of truth, he is claiming that Christianity is vastly inferior to
ancient Greek culture. Both Origen and Celsus claimed that their own culture was more
ancient. As a result, Origen’s problem with Celsus’ assertion that an ancient doctrine existed
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See Droge, p. 8
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was not at all about the internal merits of the argument itself since he clearly agreed with
Celsus that such doctrines do exist. Rather, his disagreement arose due to Celsus’ exclusion
of the Jews and the Christians from the list of people who received these ancient doctrines.
Origen’s usage of the argument from antiquity is concurrent with his realization that if
Celsus would not admit the Jews into the exclusive circle of people who have access to truth,
then the Christians were ruled out as well. For both thinkers then, the judgment was the
same: to arrive late on the scene of history within an already existing culture was tantamount
to being subordinate to that culture, and thus inferior.
By the time of the Contra Celsum, Origen believed that the historiography concerning
the antiquity of the Jews was so solid and well established that he could simply refer to the
authoritativeness of previous historians’ work as proof of his argument. The apologists of
the second century had stabilized the argument so well that by Origen’s time he thought it
was “superfluous to quote them here”; instead he simply refers the reader to the
unquestioned witness of Josephus’ Contra Apionem and even Tatian’s Oratio ad Graecos.73
Celsus frustrates Origen’s attempts to make the antiquity argument by separating Judaism
from Christianity. If the Christians had really nothing to do with Judaism then they could
not use the antiquity of Judaism to support their own religious claims.
The effectiveness of Celsus’ attack on the vulgar novelty of Christianity can be seen
early in Book I when Celsus describes Jesus as the organizer of the Christian movement,
emphasizing that it was only “a very few years ago [that] he [that is, Jesus] taught this
doctrine and was considered by the Christians to be son of God.”74 Why should we believe
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in Jesus and his religion if he was so recently alive? Origen’s response will be that despite
Jesus’ recent activity, the meaning of his life’s work embodied ancient truths.
The argument from antiquity is spread rather sporadically throughout the Contra
Celsum. Despite this, there is a rather predictable pattern that begins to emerge in those
sections: Celsus will accuse the Christians of plagiarizing some Hellenistic idea or practice
and Origen will counter with the claim that the antiquity of Christianity—via Judaism—
precludes plagiarism. Naturally it is the Greeks who were guilty of such borrowing. For
example, Celsus thinks that the Christians had “misunderstood the doctrine of the Greeks
and barbarians” concerning conflagrations and floods, and that Moses had merely taken
Deucalion’s flood and used it in his own account.75 Origen’s strategy here, as elsewhere, is
simply to claim that even though “Celsus has read widely and shows that he knows many
stories, he failed to give attention to the antiquity of Moses…”76
To say that Moses is earlier than any Greek thinker is to say that any truth in Greek
culture is a derivation from the fount of Mosaic wisdom. This means that the establishment
of truth is contingent upon the demonstration of antiquity. Contemporary Christians who
trace their own late-breaking understandings of the tradition back to the earliest possible
period are also presupposing that truth is purest in its earliest historical expression, and that
the accumulation of history only takes us farther away from that pure origin. The theology
of history implicit here is perhaps of a species with Hesiod’s account of a golden age in a
remote antique past, which later cultures can only hope to imitate in their inevitable decline
from truth.
CC 4.11
ibid. cf. CC 5.15 where Origen alleges that the doctrine of a world-conflagration was “probably”
borrowed from the Hebrews by the Greeks. CC 6.43 wherein Origen counters Celsus’ claim that the
notion of Satan was stolen from the Greek poets. See also 6.47; 7.28
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Celsus also claims that Moses took the story of Phaethon and applied it to the
Sodom and Gomorrah narrative, which Origen counters simply by observing that once
again, Celsus had “failed to notice the evidence of Moses’ antiquity.”77 Disparaging the
cultural and philosophical integrity of Judaism was damaging enough to Christian identity,
but Celsus was aware of an even more dangerous argument. He saw clearly enough that to
disassociate Christianity from Judaism was to remove the historical and theological basis for
Christian belief. Not surprisingly, then, he argues that the “Christians also add certain
doctrines to those maintained by the Jews, and assert that the Son of God has already come
on account of the sins of the Jews, and that because the Jews punished Jesus and gave him
gall to drink they drew upon themselves the bitter anger of God.”78 The power of Celsus’
argument rests in its strategy of dissociating Christianity from Judaism, thus destroying the
premises of the argument from antiquity. Insofar as this strategy could work, it would have
shaken the entire foundation of Christian apologetics, which explains Origen’s vehement
opposition to it.
Such a devastating critique could not go unanswered, but it put Origen in a difficult
position. He had to argue for a basic historical continuity between Judaism and Christianity,
while simultaneously distancing Christianity from living Judaism. Instead of arguing for
basic affinities between contemporary Judaism and Christianity, Origen simply reaffirms the
anti-Judaism of early Christianity that Celsus had observed. One clear example of antiJudaism in the Contra Celsum is Origen’s usage of the myth of deicide: “I challenge anyone to
prove my statement untrue if I say that the entire Jewish nation was destroyed less than one
CC 4.21. Celsus has to stretch the narrative slightly to make the comparison: Phaethon, Helios’ son
chartered his chariot to close to earth almost causing a conflagration, but there is no narrative of judgment
on human evil.
78 CC 4.22
77
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whole generation later on account of these sufferings which they inflicted upon Jesus.”79 So,
even though there are clear and vitally important connections between Judaism and
Christianity, those connections do not mean that contemporary Jews are better off than
Christians. The relationship between Judaism and Christianity in the Contra Celsum is
superficial, because it is predicated almost wholly on texts.80
The arguments about antiquity are perhaps the least enlightening examples of
philosophical argumentation in the Contra Celsum. We have already observed that both
Origen and Celsus shared many of the same presuppositions, namely that their own culture
could lay claim to an antique provenance and thus have an exclusive hold on truth. When
accusations of cultural theft or plagiarism occur, they are merely reversed and hurled back at
the accuser based on the proof from antiquity. The predictable structure emerges in a typical
example: take Celsus’ view of the ancient Jews, who “were totally uneducated and had not
heard of these things which were sung in poetry long before by Hesiod and thousands of other
inspired men.”81 The Jews had crafted a dubious and childish story about humans being
physically formed by God and a crafty serpent who easily leads them into deception, all of
which is guilty of “making God into a weakling right from the beginning” and most
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Peter J. Gorday has argued that despite the appearance of anti-Judaism in the Contra Celsum, Origen was
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Alexandria: His World and His Legacy. Ed. by Charles Kannengiesser and William Petersen. University of
Notre Dame Press: Notre Dame, 1998. pp. 313-336. It is likely that Origen’s view of Judaism was more
pacific than his predecessors, and certainly many of the vehemently anti-Judaic Christians afterwards. The
overwhelming textual evidence seems to suggest that this view of Judaism, was still, as I said above, a view
of a “textualized” Judaism. That is to say, a Judaism that one encounters in the Old Testament as
interpreted by Christians.
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offensive.82 Origen’s response is by this point de rigueur, he finds it amusing that Celsus could
ignore the clear and distinctly evident fact that Moses lived “long before the Trojan war.”83
The argument from antiquity had many concomitant themes as have already been
seen with the second century apologists. Recall the popular assertion, first made by
Egyptian historians, then picked up by the Jews and Christians, that the Greek philosophers
had brought back ancient wisdom to Greece from Egypt after their stint as Egyptian
tourists. Origen’s rare usage of this particular theme surfaces in a classic example of a
Christian appropriation of a non-Christian text. In response to Celsus’ belittling of the
serpent character in Genesis 3, Origen attempts to dispel its absurdity by comparing it to
Plato’s Symposium.
To do this, Origen allegorizes Plato. He wants to show that the Genesis narrative is
not as absurd as Celsus had supposed, and he does this in two basic ways. First, he argues
that Plato had borrowed heavily from Moses for his own philosophical purposes. Secondly,
he claims that the surface literal meaning of Plato’s text is quite absurd. Surface meanings in
general are the kinds of shallow readings that only superficial readers are prone to make.
Origen imagines that the surface meaning of the birth of Eros in Plato’s Symposium would
make anybody
“ridicule the myth and make a mock of so great a man as Plato. But if they
could find Plato’s meaning by examining philosophically what he expresses in
the form of a myth, they would admire the way in which he was able to hide
the great doctrines as he saw them in the form of a myth on account of the
multitude, and yet to say what was necessary for those who know how to
discover from myths the true significance by their author.”84
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The “great doctrines” hidden so expertly in Plato’s text are veiled references to the Garden
of Eden and the serpent. By delving past the superficial covering of the text, Origen is
claiming that Celsus’ mistake was in not thinking as deeply as Christians do about their own
texts. If Celsus could go deeper, he would see all the rich allusions that Plato had made to
Moses’ writings. How did Plato gain access to Moses’ wisdom? Origen thinks that Plato
had traveled to Egypt and perhaps read the Pentateuch there. “It is not clear” he comments
“whether Plato happened to hit on these matters by chance, or whether, as some think, on
his visit to Egypt he met even with those who interpret the Jews traditions
philosophically.”85
The proof from antiquity was an investment in the weight and authority of
traditionalism. A.H. Armstrong has noted that for Origen and many of his co-religionists,
the weight and authority of tradition was a strong determinant of truth. He cautions modern
readers that they might miss this point because, as he puts it, “We are too deeply affected by
a sense of historical relativity to accept the teaching of any traditional authority as absolutely
definitive and all-sufficient…”86 Whether or not the argument from antiquity seems quaint
and foolish to us today, it certainly was a powerfully persuasive argument for Origen and
Celsus.
ibid. cf. CC 6.19 where Plato is alleged to have borrowed “the words of the Phaedrus from some
Hebrews.”
86 A.H. Armstrong, op cit. p. 431. Cf. Pierre Hadot’s Philosophy as a Way of Life, ed. Arnold I. Davidson.
Blackwell: Oxford, 1995. Hadot writes “Philosophers of the modern era, from the seventeenth to the
beginning of the nineteenth centuries, refused the argument from authority and abandoned the exegetical
mode of thinking. They began to consider that the truth was not a ready-made given, but was rather the
result of a process of elaboration, carried out by a reason grounded in itself. After an initial period of
optimism, however, in which people believed it was possible for thought to postulate itself in an absolute
way, philosophy began to become more and more aware…of its historical and especially linguistic
conditioning” (p. 76). It is not clear that you find anything so strongly formulated in the Contra Celsum—
Origen certainly accepts the weight of his Christianized reading of the Jewish tradition, but the notion of a
simple acceptance of a ‘ready-made truth’, while possibly implicit in some passages, is hardly pervasive.
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ii.

Moral Effect Argument
Another major argument in the Contra Celsum is what I’m calling the “moral effect”

argument, which has several components. For Origen, the argument arises to give a
criterion of judgment to properly adjudicate between Christian and non-Christian truth
claims. It is a rather expansive category of argumentation, ranging from the reasons for why
one might believe in such things as the historicity of miracles, the divinity of Jesus, to basic
judgments concerning the more general truth of philosophy and religion.
Origen realized that to simply hurl Christian beliefs at a non-believer as if it were
self-evidently true, without any arguments or reasons, would be woefully inadequate for his
polemical purposes. He had to give reasons that would count as such in non-Christian
settings. Accordingly, he argued that the basic difference between Greek and Christian
religion was fundamentally a moral issue. He believed that pagan divination and miracles
certainly do occur, but they have no telos, no moral goal that believers can follow after in the
hopes of spiritual reformation. Jesus’ ministry and miracles were true and exceptional
because they were directed towards a unitary and clear objective: the complete moral
reformation of human beings. Non-Christian miracles serve no clear moral purpose. In
fact, they are often morally destructive.
The moral effect argument was very important for Origen’s defense of Jesus against
Celsus’ aspersions. Celsus was very dubious about the Christian claim that Jesus was divine.
When confronted with this skepticism, Origen argued that

Instead, one finds Origen struggling to make the received truths intelligible to a non-Christian audience,
and in formulating these, he makes them in some sense his own.
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“if any man were able to deliver souls from the flood of evil and from
licentiousness and wrongdoing and from despising God, and were to give as
a proof of this work one hundred reformed characters…could one
reasonably say that it was without divine help that this man had implanted in
the hundred men a doctrine capable of delivering them from evils of such
magnitude?”87
One should not take it for granted that Jesus was divine. A likely proof of this divinity was
the increased morality brought on by Jesus’ activities. Of course, it seems unlikely that
Origen and Celsus would have agreed on the presence of moral reformation in Christians’
lives, but Origen thought it was obvious.
Celsus prompts this response again when he has a hypothetical Jew88 cast doubt on
Jesus’ divinity by alleging that many other religious charlatans had claimed to be a “son of
God.” Origen admits that many people had claimed to be divine, but very few people
currently worship these so-called messiahs. Simon Magus was one person who had made
such extravagant claims, “but now of all the Simonians in the world it is possible, I believe,
to find thirty, and perhaps I have exaggerated the number.”89 The assumption here is that if
Simon Magus truly were divine, then he would have had a more pragmatic moral effect on
people.
Precisely what aspersions did Celsus cast on Jesus? One thing that Celsus found
distasteful was Jesus’ willingness to associate with people of ill repute. Celsus accuses Jesus
of being a leader of “infamous men…the most wicked tax-collectors and sailors” to which
Origen agreed that Jesus had in fact called sinners to his ministry, but he saw nothing

CC 1.26
Throughout Books I and II, Origen has chosen the sections of Celsus’ True Doctrine wherein Celsus
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intrinsically wrong with that since it is especially sinners that need moral reformation.90 In
fact, what better way to show Jesus’ power than to lead such wicked men like the disciples to
“the purest moral character”?91 It is likely that Origen is implicitly critiquing Celsus’ elitism
here, since Celsus’ tastes were offended by Jesus’ involvement with people of questionable
character. Origen brilliantly reveals the hypocrisy of Celsus’ critique by appealing to similar
examples from the Greek philosophical tradition.
For example, Socrates had led his disciple Phaedo out of dire moral straits.
Xenocrates’ successor Polemo had led a most depraved life before converting to
philosophy.92 Why should these men be so very different from the disciples of Jesus in that
regard? After all, philosophy is only useful insofar as it helps other humans. Origen argued
that all philosophy “should be approved on the ground that its doctrine in those who
persuaded them had the power to change men from such evils although they had previously
been gripped by them.”93 There are few such examples in philosophical history of dramatic
moral reformation, especially when compared with the many examples found in the Gospels.
So, we have seen how the moral effect argument served as a criterion for judging the
claims about Jesus’ divinity and the pragmatic utility of philosophy. Let us briefly examine
how Origen also extends the argument to Greek religion. Celsus wondered why the
Christians saw Jesus as so exceptional. After all, a god becoming human in Greek religion
was not especially unique. Why should one worship the Christian god as if he were unique
when you had so many older and better deities like Asclepius, Dionysus or Heracles?
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Origen responds by arguing that the Greek gods had done much less to help
humanity when compared with Jesus: “What work as great as his [i.e. Jesus] has been done
by Asclepius, Dionysus and Heracles? Can they support their claim to be gods by proving
that there are people who have been reformed in morals and have become better as a result
of their life and teaching?”94 The answer to these rhetorical questions is a resounding “no.”
The Greek myths, on Origen’s reading, are simply immoral catalogues of human, all too
human sin. Indeed, the Greek stories are so distasteful that one must use allegorical readings
to make them less offensive. Who would not want to seek “refuge in allegory” after reading
of “divine sons” who “castrate their divine fathers”?95 It is in Greek mythology that one can
read that “A father has sexual intercourse with his daughter.”96 None of these stories can be
seen as morally helpful. Origen is saying, “Who is edified by these stories?”
Origen’s disgust with Greek mythology was not shared by Celsus. Celsus viewed the
divine births of the Greek gods Perseus, Amphion, Aeacus and Minos as “evidence of their
great and truly wonderful works for mankind,” and he wonders “what have you [i.e. the
Christians] done in word or deed that is fine or wonderful?”97 Origen predictably claims that
Celsus was in fact wrong about the deeds of the Greek deities. He claims that even if such
deeds had been done, they would pale in comparison with the good deeds of Jesus.
Presented with such arguments, many non-Christians would undoubtedly have
agreed with the critique of the Greek deities that Origen advanced in the Contra Celsum, but
not with the implications that he drew from it—namely, that Christianity was better. The
CC 3.42 cf 7.6, where Pythian Apollo is derided for not using his clairvoyance “for the conversion and
healing and moral reformation of men.”
95 CC 4.48
96 Ibid. Origen does not mention the Jewish analogue to Greek incest, namely in Genesis 19:30-38—
wherein Lot’s daughters, apparently convinced that they are the last living survivors of divine destruction,
entice their father into drunken procreation.
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philosophical critique of “superstitious” and anthropomorphic religion that he employs
already had a long history by the time he was writing.98 Plato had famously banished Homer
from the Republic for the immorality and anthropomorphism of the gods depicted in his
poetry.99 The Platonic critique of anthropomorphism was based upon the belief that God,
being completely incorporeal, was separated from the world of materiality and becoming.
Another integral component of Platonism was the belief in divine immutability, which
complemented the emphasis on incorporeality, since the highest divinity, being necessarily
spiritual, could not come into being or pass away.
The Platonic god could not, in short, be human in any way shape or form. This
lends itself naturally to a strong suspicion of anthropomorphizing divine beings; hence the
notion of a Zeus coming down to the human realm and procreating with women would
have been anathema to many philosophers, and not just to Christians and Jews. This
appropriation of the Platonic evaluation of divine incorporeality by Christians was an
important step towards establishing persuasive discourse since this bridged the gap between
Christians and philosophically minded Greeks.
The Christian usage of the traditional critique of licentiousness and immorality in
Greek mythology was not aimed at denying the existence of the gods—as some
contemporary readers might suspect. Instead of being denied their existence, the gods were
demoted to the status of demons. The social institutions that were organized around
them—the cultic practices, the mantic frenzies and divine afflatus of the oracles—were all
reinterpreted as the immoral fabrications of very real demonic forces. We have already seen
CC 1.67
See Attridge, Harold W. “The Philosophical Critique of Religion under the Early Empire.” In Aufstief
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the subordination of the Greek gods to daemons in the writings of Justin and Tatian, and
Origen is simply following the apologetic tradition. So, Origen had plenty of material to
draw upon when he wanted to critique Greek religion. But he does not merely lambaste the
Greek stories for their immorality; he thinks there are additional reasons for looking
elsewhere for one’s edification.
At one point in the Contra Celsum, Origen proposes a tabula rasa to sympathetic
readers who are interested in deciding between Christian and non-Christian stories. “Let us
compare them all with one another,” Origen proclaims, “and consider the aim which those
who caused them to be written had in view, and resulting help or harm, or neither, to those
who were the recipients of the supposed benefits.”100 It looks like Origen assumed that after
reflecting on this question, the hypothetical reader here would agree that the Christian stories
were clearly more beneficial than the Greek stories. Origen is saying that reasonable people
would agree that Christian stories were clearly aimed at helping readers, while Greek stories
were not. Origen clearly believes that there are convincing and salient truths about
Christianity that will just thrust themselves upon the reader, despite that reader’s
predispositions.
Another way in which Celsus attempted to discredit Jesus’ divine status was to
disparage him as a false magician, as nothing more than a cheap miracle maker. When
Celsus claims that Jesus was a mere sorcerer, it should be clear by now that Origen has a
ready response. He argues, “But in fact no sorcerer uses his tricks to call the spectators to
moral reformation…nor does he attempt to persuade the onlookers to live as men who will
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be judged by God.”101 Celsus repeats this accusation of sorcery many times throughout the
text, and Origen’s response is always the same; sorcerers are not interested in inducing moral
reformation in people.102 Many men claim to be messiahs and sons of God; many perform
miracles as proof of such claims; but the trustworthiness of Jesus should be apparent to all
by virtue of the fact that “Christ and his disciples bore fruit not in deceit but in the salvation
of souls.”103 The moral effect argument is used to systematically trump any argument that
Celsus made concerning the dubious character of Jesus and the nature of Jesus’ miracles.
Now, Origen and Celsus were not skeptical about the possibility of miracles
occurring; they were more concerned with what purpose the miracles served.104 Origen does
not remain agnostic concerning the occurrence of miracles; rather he offers a criterion for
preferring Christian miracles to non-Christian ones. The Christian miracles, simply put, help
morally reform people, while non-Christian miracles serve very little purpose. Disputes
often arise in the Contra Celsum about miracles, and they generally revolved around two types
of questions: what was the cause of a given miracle and how does one know the cause? The
cause of Christian miracles is the power of the Christian God; while the non-Christian
miracles arise from the malevolent workings of daemons. We have the answer to our first
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104 It would be anachronistic to project our own naturalistic arguments against the so-called miraculous
into the minds of the late antique thinker. To seriously question the historicity of a miracle only on the
grounds of its physical probability based on an understanding of natural law would have never really
occurred to Origen or Celsus. For this period, instead of reading “miracles” as non-natural interventions
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question about the causes behind miracles. Now, how does one know that this is indeed the
cause?105
Celsus attacked Jesus’ miracles by suggesting that it was difficult to know if any
trustworthy witness of the miracles truly existed. Commenting on the transfiguration, Celsus
wonders “What trustworthy witness saw this apparition…? There is no proof except for your
word and the evidence which you may produce of one of the men who were punished with
There was some disagreement about the reliability of sense perceptions and general epistemological
questions in the Hellenistic era. Pyrrho, the founder of skepticism, held that true knowledge was
impossible because the nature of the world is indeterminate. Indeterminacy resulted not from any
inherent flaw in our sensory and cognitive apparatuses, but from the general lack of availability of facts
themselves. As a result, we should be “unopinionated, uncommitted and unwavering, saying concerning
each individual thing that it no more is than is not, or it both is and is not, or it neither is nor is not” (see
Aristocles, qtd. in The Hellenistic Philosophers. Vol. 1 trans. and ed. by A. A. Long and D.N. Sedley.
Cambridge: CUP, 1987: p. 14.) Skeptical philosophers’ epistemologies differed most substantially from the
other Hellenistic schools in their conclusion that no determinate reality exists waiting to be discovered;
there is no intrinsic structure of the universe from which one can derive truth, and no criterion of giving
our sense perceptions the foundations we so desire.
The Epicureans, on the other hand, gave much more credence to the possibility of knowledge by
arguing that our sense-perceptions are always true, but our judgments about them are not (See Lucretius,
ibid. pp. 78-79.) The kanon for determining truth was a combination of sensations, preconceptions
(prolepsis), and feelings (pathos), all of which were needed to decide the nature of truth (See Diogenes
Laertius, qtd. in ibid. p. 87.) The notion of a ‘preconception’ here is perhaps the most fundamental
kriterion for truth; the Epicureans thought they had gotten past the impasse of the epistemic problematic
by admitting from the start that we all begin our inquiries with certain given categories (i.e. preconceived
notions) which guide the inquiry along the way. Otherwise, one would always be searching for the most
determinative and bedrock foundation behind the starting point of an epistemic issue.
The Stoics, following the lead of Epicurus on epistemological issues, were the philosophical
school which Origen found most expedient for advancing his own epistemic views. They had a much
more optimistic view concerning the possibility of obtaining true knowledge. A paradigmatic example can
be found in the philosopher Zeno, for whom sense-perception—which had been so thoroughly
problematized by the Skeptics—emerged as a reliable basis for “scientific knowledge” (See Sedley and
Long, p. 254.) The Stoics held that knowledge came about by virtue of a self-authenticating impression on
one’s mind, via the process of “an object (to_ faino/menon) which, through the senses, produces an
impression (fantasi/a) on the soul (Hauck, p. 241.)
This comes about through the faculty of assent humans have in their cognitive makeup, what the
Stoics called the phantasia kataleptike (katalhptikh_n fantasi&an). The phantasia is itself its own
criterion of truth; there is no other ground of knowledge besides this self-evident epistemic principle.
Accordingly, one cannot help but give one’s assent to propositions or the existence of physical realities
when these impressions come to the mind so forcefully, bearing their own validation with them. It would
be misleading, however, to suggest that every impression was as self-evidently true as the phantasia
kataleptike; indeed, there are many false impressions that can arise just as easily. Many Stoics, for example,
thought that the kinds of perceptions people had of dreams and prophetic phenomena should be treated
rather skeptically (See Hauck, p. 242 ff.)
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you.”106 Origen’s response indicates the extent to which he was familiar with the Stoic and
Academic debates on epistemology. He admits that it is indeed virtually impossible to
establish “any story as historical fact” to such a high degree as “complete certainty”107
Lacking this highest degree of epistemic certainty, one cannot possibly hope to even prove
the occurrence of the Trojan War, for example. The Trojan War itself undoubtedly took
place, but the account of the war was interwoven with references to fantastic deities. Deities
are, of course, notorious for their reluctance to submit themselves to the test of empirical
verifications.108 Must one, as the Skeptics and Stoics argued, withhold assent completely
from such stories? Is there no epistemic warrant at all for giving one’s assent?
Origen was, of course, emphatically not a disciple of Pyrrho, or wholly a Stoic on
epistemic issues. 109 His strategy for addressing the trustworthiness of sense perception is to
subordinate it to a kind of moral epistemology, what he called the “divine sense.” The
“divine sense” is the sense impression of truth given only to men of virtue.110 This is the
sense in which Origen is more of a Platonist than a Stoic epistemologically speaking—for
the Platonists held that true knowledge, moving from the realm of becoming to the realm of
being, was available only to the man of virtue. In other words, men of virtue can see more
clearly. They can penetrate more effectively into the perception of truth. This can be called
CC 1.41
CC 1.42
108 But perhaps not, for it seems as if one of the central implications of the moral effect argument is that
the veracity of the Christian account of Jesus’ divinity can be verified by appeals to empirical evidences,
like the moral reformation brought about by the efficacious work of said divinity.
109 For an overview of the influence of Stoic thought on Origen, specifically epistemological issues, see
Henry Chadwick, “Origen, Celsus and the Stoa”, JTS 48 (1947), pp. 34-48. John M. Rist, “The
Importance of Stoic Logic in the Contra Celsum” and “Beyond Stoic and Platonist: A Sample of Origen’s
Treatment of Philosophy (Contra Celsum 4.62-70)” in Platonism and its Christian Heritage. London:
Variorum, 1985, pp. 64-78. Ronald E. Heine, “Stoic Logic as Handmaid to Exegesis”, JTS v. 44, (1993),
pp. 90-117. Robert J. Hauck “They saw what they said they saw: sense knowledge in early Christian
polemic”, Harvard Theological Review, 81 (1988), pp. 239-249.
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“moral epistemology” simply because it links knowing with being moral. So, to answer
Celsus’ question about who was trustworthy enough to verify a miracle of Jesus, Origen has
to hold that the disciples and the gospel writers were trustworthy enough because they were
men of virtue.

iii.

Argument from Prophecy
The proof from prophecy is periodically used to substantiate a myriad of potentially

implausible events narrated in the Gospels. Origen viewed this proof as a “very powerful”
argument111, in fact, the “strongest argument confirming Jesus’ authority.”112 Origen’s
reliance on the proof is in stark contrast to Celsus’ casual rejection of it. Celsus reduced it to
the level of a mere interpretative squabble between Christians and Jews. His disdain is
palpable when he describes the disagreement about the meaning of prophecy as nothing
more than a “wrangle with one another about the shadow of an ass.”113 This pejorative
comment was meant to suggest that there was an aura of triviality about the Jewish-Christian
interpretative debates—but for Origen, of course, a great deal more was at stake.
Origen does not stake his entire argument for miracles on his morally based
epistemological convictions; he occasionally relies upon the proof from prophecy.114
Naturally, this is brought in to argue for Jesus’ divine status, but it arises as a response to
Celsus’ charge of sorcery against Jesus. “The miracles which he did” Origen comments, were
“not by sorcery as Celsus thinks, but by a divine power foretold by the prophets.”115 The
CC 2.28
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114 See Henry Chadwick “The Evidences of Christianity in the Apologetic of Origen” in Heresy and
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miracle of the virgin birth is defended by Origen on similar grounds. Celsus had attempted
to debunk the virgin birth as a deceit constructed by Christians to cover up the fact that
Jesus’ birth was the fruit of an adulterous liaison between Mary and a Roman soldier.116
Origen rejects such aspersions out of hand, claiming instead that the virgin birth was part of
a carefully scripted divine plan which had been clearly prophesied in the Old Testament.117
We have already seen some skepticism from Celsus about the Christian readings of
Old Testament prophecy, but we have yet to flesh out the systematic meanings and purposes
of the proof from prophecy. The demonstration of this proof relied upon the unveiling of
Christian meanings in a Jewish text, namely readings that purported to show that Jesus of
Nazareth was the subject matter of a variety of different prophecies. If these readings could
be established as persuasive, then the Old Testament could be seen as an authoritative
witness to central Christian claims.
As a persuasive technique, the proof from prophecy was apparently quite successful.
It seems to have been an integral component in Justin Martyr’s conversion, and features
prominently in his apologetic writings.118 The power of prophecy was certainly something
that Origen believed in, and pointed to consistently in the Contra Celsum. He had argued as
early as Book I that
A man coming to the gospel from Greek conceptions and training would not only
judge that it [i.e. the truths of Christianity] was true, but would also put it into practice
and so prove it to be correct; and he would complete what seemed to be lacking
judged by the criterion of a Greek proof, thus establishing the truth of Christianity.
Moreover, we have to say this, that the gospel has a proof which is peculiar to itself,
and which is more divine than a Greek proof based on dialectical argument. This
more divine demonstration the apostle calls a ‘demonstration of the Spirit and of
CC 1.32 Celsus alleges that the male adulterer was a certain Panthera, which might indicate a Jewish
polemical source.
117 CC 1.33-34
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116

47

power’…because of the prophecies and especially those which refer to Christ, which are capable of
convincing anyone who reads them…119

This is an extraordinary passage because it so succinctly summarizes Origen’s polemical
presuppositions. There is in Christianity, Origen believed, something that transcended the
merely “dialectical” truths of Hellenistic philosophy. Truth was not something that one
merely progressed towards through analogy and abstract intellectual feats, but something
that a thinker lived and embodied through a life of virtue. The hypothetical person with this
philosophical training might “judge” Christianity to be true by “putting it into practice’” but
Christianity is not so narrow as to commend itself only to a person so carefully trained.
Truth commends itself to “anyone” who approaches the central proof of Christianity,
namely the prophecies of Christ found in the Old Testament.
Later in Book I, Origen describes the proof from prophecy as the “strongest
argument confirming Jesus’ authority” insofar as it establishes that he “was prophesied by
the prophets of the Jews, Moses and those after him and even before him.”120 Origen even
claims that Celsus ignores the power of the prophecies because “he is unable to reply to the
argument.”121 A strong statement to be sure, but why such confidence? Is Celsus’ truly struck
dumb by the clarity of the Christian reading of the Old Testament? This does not seem
likely; Celsus continually presses Origen in other passages about the plausibility of the
Christian usage of Jewish material. Origen even admits that some Jews had pressed him on
these very readings, wondering where the Christians get the title “son of God” from the
prophetic material.122 But the arguments went beyond semantics in many cases, for Origen
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saw the combined authority of the prophetic materials as an overwhelming argument. Why
then, did the Jews resist seeing it?
Celsus observed that many have been perplexed by this question: “If the prophecies
of Jesus possessed by the Jews were so clear, why then, when he came, did they not accept
his teaching and change to the superior doctrines which Jesus had shown to them?”123 The
answer, Origen speculated, was the result of a profound recalcitrance towards seeing the
obvious nature of truth, brought about by the Jews’ stubborn attitudes. It is hard to tear
oneself from these fixed habits, Origen argued, harder still when those habits are of a
religious kind.124 The image here is startling not only for its ominous foreshadowing of later
developments in Christian anti-Judaism, but also for its stark polarization of Christians and
Jews. The picture of Christians is of a group of enlightened readers, open to reason, willing
to listen to new ideas when they are backed up by proof. Jews, on the other hand, are
stubborn traditionalists, blind to the truth because of their resistance in seeing the truth of
Christianity.
While the majority of the passages in which Origen discusses Judaism are restricted
to Biblical Judaism, there are a few passages where he tells us that he has had multiple
discussions with Jews about Biblical interpretation. Before a long section on prophecy,
Origen reminisces about a time when he had “a discussion with some Jews, who were
alleged to be wise”125 about the reasons for believing in the historicity of Moses and Jesus.
Concerning these two exemplars of Judaism and Christianity, Origen claims that “Both of
them have the testimony of nations,” but outside of that, the Jews “have no proof about
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Moses…indeed what is startling is that it is the evidence about Jesus in the law and the
prophets which is used to prove that Moses and the prophets really were prophets of
God.”126 No grounds for the historicity of Moses then, except for the witness provided
retrospectively by the stories about Jesus. It is odd that for most of his polemic, Origen has
relied upon the antiquity of Judaism to “prove” Christianity. Now the tables have turned: it
is the Jews who need Christian witnesses to demonstrate the truth of their own religion.
Celsus’ assertion that Christianity was not the fulfillment of Judaism was a
continuous thorn in Origen’s side. If Christianity is not the fulfillment of Judaism, then the
prophecies of the Old Testament were all false. Of course, one need not only attack the
Christian readings of prophecies, one could look at the differences between the Christian
New Testament and the Jewish Bible. Celsus’ knowledge of the New Testament armed him
with a powerful critique of the disparity between Jesus’ teachings and the teachings found in
the Old Testament. One of the clearest examples is worth quoting in full:
“If the prophets of the God of the Jews foretold that Jesus would be his son, why
did he give them laws by Moses that they were to become rich and powerful and to
fill the earth and to massacre their enemies, children and all, and slaughter their
entire race, which he himself did, so Moses says, before the eyes of the Jews? And
besides this, if they were not obedient, why does he expressly threaten to do to them
what he did to their enemies? Yet his son, the man of Nazareth, gives contradictory
laws, saying that a man cannot come forward to the Father if he is rich or loves
power or lays claim to any intelligence or reputation, and that he must not pay
attention to food or to his storehouse any more than the ravens, or to clothing any
more than the lilies, and that to a man who has struck him once he should offer
himself to be struck once again. Who is wrong? Moses or Jesus? Or when the father
sent Jesus had he forgotten what commands he gave to Moses? Or did he condemn
his own laws and change his mind, and send his messenger for quite the opposite
purpose?”127

Celsus’ sees a fundamental disparity between the Christian claims of continuity with Judaism,
and the altogether different realities of the Old Testament. Whereas previous cultural
126
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opponents of Christianity had not been generally familiar with the key texts of the Christian
religion, Celsus brings to his polemic a much more sophisticated understanding of the basic
claims of those texts. In seizing upon this potential disparity, Celsus was attacking the very
foundation of Christianity.
Origen’s response to this is not to suddenly proclaim the novelty of Christianity visà-vis Biblical Judaism—that would have undermined his own position—but rather to argue
that Celsus had fatally misinterpreted the Scriptures. Celsus’ error was in thinking “that in
the law and the prophets there is no deeper doctrine beyond that of the literal meaning of
the words.”128 Origen’s understanding of the multivocality of Scripture, enforced by the
Pauline notion of a dichotomy between the “letter that kills” and the “spirit gives life” is
prominent in his rebuttal.129 Celsus was obviously reading the text on its most superficial
level of meaning, exhibiting the danger of the “letter that kills” by taking the surface value of
the text. If one attends closely to the passages under consideration, one will see that the
“literal interpretation is impossible.”130
When the Psalms writer says, for example, that “Every morning I killed all the
sinners on earth, to destroy from the city of the Lord all the workers of iniquity”131, Origen
suggests that it would have been impossible for such an event to take place, given the absurd
logistics required in executing such massive carnage. This is symptomatic of Origen’s larger
strategy; he knows better than to defiantly affirm the literal meaning of the text because of
the moral offense that would result from such readings, so he is pushed to find some deeper,
in his terms, “spiritual” meaning to the text. If Origen sees an argument leading to the
CC 7.18 italics added
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establishment of a possible disparity between Judaism and Christianity he averts disaster
through his program of allegorical and non-literal interpretations. Origen must stress
continuity with Judaism, but he cannot stress it at the expense of having Christianity appear
just like Judaism, or on an equal footing. Non-literal readings are an argument for that
continuity by virtue of establishing, for example, that Jesus did not promulgate laws that
contradicted Moses’ dictums. Celsus is well aware of the remarkable ambivalence displayed
by Christians towards Jews: he notes that the Christians “originated from Judaism…they
cannot name any other source for their teacher and chorus-leader. Nevertheless they
rebelled against the Jews.”132
Despite Celsus’ separation of Christianity from Judaism, he has few kind words for
the Jewish religion. He echoes the anti-Judaic writers’ theme that the Jews had been of
Egyptian extraction, hence copiers of another culture. He sees both the Exodus event and
the early Christian movement as dual examples of Jewish misanthropy insofar as the Jews’
actions had “led to the introduction of new ideas” by “revolting against the Egyptian
community” and later the Romans.133 Furthermore, the Jews “never did anything of
importance” and “were of no significance or prominence whatever.”134 Nonetheless, despite
the Jews adherence to “worship which may be very peculiar…[it] is at least traditional.”135
This strong traditionalism is the lynchpin of Celsus’ evaluation of religious truth. Insofar as
Celsus could separate Christians from Jews, he had automatically discredited them, since “it
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is impious to abandon the customs which have existed in each locality from the
beginning.”136
If Celsus was foolish for reading too superficially in the Old Testament, then he was
undoubtedly ignorant for ignoring the power of prophecies in those same texts. The
ambiguity of phrases in Isaiah 53 such as “Surely he has borne our infirmities and carried our
diseases” could now be heard as unambiguous prophecy fulfilled in Jesus to the ears of
Christians. Where contemporary Christians saw Jesus as the obvious subject matter of this
passage, the Jews saw a figurative device for talking about Israel as a nation. Origen is
amazed at the Jews’ wayward readings that precluded seeing prophecies about Jesus in the
text. “Who is this if not Jesus Christ?” Origen wonders. For Origen, the Jews’ resistance to
this reading is symptomatic of a more general stubbornness to ascend from the bodily, literal
level of the text, to the ethereal heights of spiritual readings.137
Origen would have to face a more effective critique than this. The apostles and the
earliest Christians were Jewish, and yet by Celsus’ time, most Christians were not Jewish.
Celsus wonders if wayward Christians of the 2nd century had “left the law of their
fathers…and…deserted to another name and another life”?138 Origen was well aware of the
potential problem this might cause, and he is eager to avoid the charge of novelty that would
wrest Christianity from its antique Jewish moorings. Jesus had hinted at such an abrogation,
but he knew his followers were not ready. This is why he enigmatically promised them “I
have still many things to say to you,”139 where “many things” signifies the purging of the
ibid.
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overly literal reading of Torah by the cleansing fire of the spiritual interpretation. This
“literal” reading resulted in the Jews’ adherence to their many festival and dietary
observances. Were not the early Jewish followers of Jesus too attached to their traditional
understanding of Judaism? Origen describes the Jews as habituated to this surface reading,
which in turn generated surface observances—but the time was coming when that would all
be transcended.
Habits can, after a long duration, become something like a fixed nature.140 Had the
Jewish habits of observing the literal level of Torah become something like a second skin, a
skin that is at one with the “bodily” or somatic reading of Scripture? Origen’s account
purports to explain the Jewish readings as a habituated stubbornness, one that cannot
penetrate into the readings of the Old Testament like the Christians. They can only “read
them superficially and only as stories.”141 But while the Jewish apostles of Jesus could be
forgiven for their observance of the “literal” law, later generations—on Origen’s reading—
would be shown less mercy. Since the Jews “did not comprehend the divinity within him
[i.e. Jesus],” they would be “entirely forsaken and possess nothing of those things which
from antiquity they have regarded as sacred, and have not even any vestige of divine power
among them.”142
Why is there no longer any remnant of God’s providential guiding of the Jews?
“Because they were very ignoble people” we are told, “and although they committed many
sins they did not suffer for them any comparable calamities to those caused by what they had
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dared to do to our Jesus.”143 Deicide accounts for the destruction of the Temple in 70 CE, the
scattering of Jews into the Diaspora, and their persecution under foreign rulers. Despite
these clear examples of anti-Judaism, it would be inaccurate to call Origen anti-Semitic.144
After all, Origen had learned Hebrew and continuously interacted with living Jews in a
friendly intellectual environment.
All of these arguments and themes in the Contra Celsum were brought about because
Celsus realized that the problem with the Christian usage of the proof from prophecy was
that many Jews did not agree with the readings of Scripture that the Christians claimed
supported the proof. Celsus found the readings forced as well. Origen’s response is to
appeal to the Christian’s deeper, more spiritual readings of the Old Testament. If these
deeper readings were adhered to faithfully, then they could reveal the true prophetic
meanings of many Old Testament passages. Even though Origen claimed to have placed
great weight on the proof from prophecy, it is simply not featured as prominently and as
frequently as the antiquity and moral effect arguments are.

Ibid. Italics added.
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VI.

Conclusion
There is a certain artificiality in selecting and then naming three “arguments” in

Origen’s Contra Celsum. He certainly did not begin his polemic by spelling out precisely
which arguments would be deployed, and in what fashion. One of the tasks of modern
exegetes is to tease out the strains of argumentative discourse that one can find in a text like
the Contra Celsum. We seek to make order out of disorder, to name what has previously gone
unnamed. We have analyzed and detailed the argument from antiquity, the moral effect
argument, and the proof from prophecy. What remains is a brief evaluation of the
persuasiveness of these arguments and an assessment of the work as a whole.
All three arguments had a rich history even before Origen decided to use them in his
polemic, and they would have an even richer future after Origen died. Of the three, the
argument from antiquity seems the weakest. To base one’s view of truth on the perceived
antiquity of the culture from which one gathers certain ideas makes a dubious assumption,
namely that the older one’s cultural heritage is, the more sound one’s grasp of truth is. But
why should we assume this? Why should we assume that just because a given culture is
older that it has a more secure grip on “truth” than we do? The apologists never answer
this. It may very well turn out that this view is warranted in certain contexts, but it should
never be taken as an a priori.
The moral effect argument is important and widely used today. At its simplest
exposition, it posits that one should believe in a given religion because the practitioners of
that religion are morally superior to the practitioners of other religions. One would like to
know if there were a way of adjudicating between the rival moral claims of a given tradition,
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such that this argument could lay claim to a kind of objectivity. To say that one is morally
superior is to open up a variety of other questions, such as the exact nature of what is moral
and so on. That is just another way of saying that this argument is not open and shut, it
relies upon the exposition of other points in other related arguments.
The proof from prophecy, at least as Origen construed it, only became a proof once
one had entered into the deeper, more spiritual realm of Christian hermeneutics. That is to
say, one could only see the Christian readings of the prophecies once one had embraced
Christian ways of reading the Old Testament. No wonder then that Celsus was so perplexed
by the proof: he simply saw no reason in entertaining such readings. Outsiders like Justin
Martyr and many others were, of course, persuaded by the proof from prophecy to convert
to Christianity. For someone like Celsus, who already had a low opinion of Judaism, the
proof from prophecy must have sounded like so much Christian mythmaking.
The Contra Celsum as a whole is a vast, rambling discursus on a whole set of
fascinating, yet tangential topics. Its tangential nature is perhaps its key impediment to real
coherence. Origen was undoubtedly a polymath for his time, as witnessed by the ease with
which he tackled a diverse and challenging set of topics. Many of these topics strayed
outside of Christian life and literature. Despite the polymathic nature of the Contra Celsum, it
lacks the focus and power of Origen’s other works—the Peri Archon especially. It is more
like a rambling and occasional encyclopedic survey of Christian argumentation than it is a
concentrated exposition on a specific topic. However, this weakness is at once its greatest
strength. The lack of editing, the rambling discursive nature of the text, and its cyclical,
often repetitive themes all give it a kind of freshness that make for a fascinating
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anthropological read. The Contra Celsum’s unwieldy nature is perhaps the main reason why it
has been so historically neglected by the Christian church.
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